Monday, October 23, 2006

Bitter Partisanship

If you thought bitter partisanship was constrained to the Western Hemisphere (where outside the U.S., Mexico is also bitterly--and evenly--divided) there is news from Eastern Europe showing how we are not alone in our "I'm right and you're wrong" attitude. At least we haven't resorted to tear gas, rubber bullets, or fire hoses yet, as is happening in Budapest now.
Today is the 50th anniversary of their 1956 uprising against the Soviet Union. So maybe, in a bittersweet sense, it is fitting.

Monday, October 16, 2006

North Korean Situation

News From the Frontier
This is a good story from the Monterey Herald about the situation in one spot along the Chinese-North Korean border. It does a good job of giving a glimmer of what is and what could happen, depending on how the situation unfolds.
Take a look, here.

From the Security Council
The AP also has a good recap of the Security Council resolution, including additional restrictions imposed by individual countries: U.S., Japan, and potentially Australia.

The Security Council voted Saturday to impose the following sanctions on North Korea, in response to its claim that it has conducted a nuclear test:
_ an embargo on major weapons hardware such as tanks, warships, combat aircraft and missiles.
_ the freezing of the assets of people or businesses connected to weapons programs.
_ a travel ban for anyone involved in weapons program.
_ a ban on the sale of luxury goods to North Korea.
_ a ban on the importing of materials that could be used in unconventional weapons or ballistic missiles.
_ a call for inspections of all cargo leaving and arriving in North Korea to prevent any illegal trafficking in unconventional weapons or ballistic missiles.
In addition to the U.N. resolution, the United States maintains its own sanctions on North Korea, including:
_ a ban on U.S. defense exports and sales to the country.
_ a ban on U.S. aid, including a halt in food deliveries through the World Food Program, though not all food assistance has been banned.
_ several financial restrictions that oppose support for North Korea from international financial institutions and restrict business with banks that the U.S. alleges have helped the regime counterfeit and launder money.
_ strict limits on the amount of trade between the two countries.
Japan has imposed the following additional measures and is considering several more:
_ a ban on the entry of North Korean ships to its ports.
_ a trade embargo.
_ a continued ban on the Mangyongbong-92 ferry's entry into Japanese waters. Japan has restricted the movement of the ferry, which once served a major conduit for trade, since July when North Korea test-fired seven missiles into the waters between the two countries.
Australia is considering the following additional sanctions:
_ a ban on the entry of North Korean ships to its ports.

Monday, October 09, 2006

Shot heard 'round the world

Thanks to everyone who has called, written, or text messaged to let me know that, about 24 hours ago, North Korea detonated a nuclear weapon. For those who don't know me, I've spent the last year and a half procrastinating finishing a master's paper on North Korea. I'm just about finished (presented oral arguments a couple of weeks ago) and have been held up from making final corrections as life has intervened a bit.

While it is quite likely that Kim Jong Il, the "Dear Leader" of the DPRK is misguided, I think it very unlikely that he and his advisors have abandoned reason. Quite the contrary. It seems more likely that the North Korean leadership is playing a game of Chinese-style self-interested real politik. Here's why:

1. South Korea's President Roh has based his foreign policy on improving relations with North Korea. He is most likely to go for reconcilliation rather than conflict.
2. Japan has a new Prime Minister--quite publically a 'hawk' when it comes to North Korea--so North Korea doesn't lose anything by incurring his wrath. Especially since Japan still doesn't have offensive military capabilities.
3. The U.S. is too bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq to mount a serious, sustained military action against the DPRK. Further, with the U.S. still holding war-time command authority on the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean forces (though fairly capable themselves) are effectively held to defensive actions without a more robust U.S. presence to use as an offensive force.
4. This may be the most significant, though the least certain: North Korea has wagered that China's drive for internal stability and economic growth (especially presently, during the once every 5-year plenary session of the National People's Congress) will outweigh China's desire to put resources into maintaining the previous status quo along it's periphery.

This last piece, though a gamble by North Korea, if correct, could allow North Korea to dramatically shift the terms of battle in their favor. And whether intentional or not, they would be using precisely the same tactic the West did against the USSR during the Cold War. The U.S. knew the Red Army was signficantly larger than our own forces, and would be able to reach deeply into Western Europe before we could mount a serious resistance or counter attack. So the U.S. used our forward stationed troops as "trip wires". If the Soviets began a major assault on Western Europe, word would quickly get back to Washington, and we'd fire nuclear weapons against the Soviets. (It's not ironic the concept for the ultimate shape of this conflict was "MAD".)

At present, though, it seems to be a general consensus that the North Koreans are unable to mount nuclear weapons on a missile for delivery at any distance (with accuracy). Their last (and first) long range missile test blew up just above the launch pad. This means that the only conceivable targets (in a traditional, nuclear combat scenario) are South Korea, or China. We can fairly well rule out China, if for no other reason, that the Chinese, if attacked, would have no mercy--and the North Koreans know this. This leaves South Korea as the main target.

The impact of using this type of weapon against Seoul, or another major population center in South Korea would be devastating. Likely, tens of millions of people would die within a few days or weeks. South Korea would be devestated--not just physically, but psychologically and emotionally as well. Remember, it is a very (geographically) small country. The resulting retaliation South Korea--and it's newfound allies around the world--would wreak upon North Korea preclude this option as well unless as a completely desperate act.

So if you were Kim Jong Il and had these nuclear weapons, and wanted to get something, what would you do? My guess is that he will try to blackmail China, S. Korea, Japan, and the U.S. into either buying the weapons, or more likely, leave open the idea that the material might somehow be sold to other parties interested in acuiring nuclear material.

But this still leaves the question--which I have yet to come up with a plausible answer for--of what is it that North Korea is seeking in it's game of real politik? If you have ideas, please send them my way.

Sunday, October 08, 2006

A uniquely American crisis

The U.S. is facing a crisis. It has to do with Iraq, but our involvement in Iraq is only a symptom of the broader problem. This thought is still forming, and remains a bit rough around the edges, but I want to through it out because it's been so long since my last post.

The U.S. military has become so effective, so powerful, so efficient at it's job: defeating identified enemies, that it has far outpaced not only our enemies and adversaries ability to fight back, but it has outpaced even our own ability to prepare for the aftermath.

What am I talking about? The men and women in our armed forces can, on very short notice, be nearly anywhere in the world, engaging in successful operations against nearly any traditional enemy we could face. The problem this creates--and where the crisis comes in--is that the rest of our government is not, and I believe should not be, in a position to deal with the consequences of such rapid victories.

Put in a concrete situation, the U.S. force in Iraq was 1. enormously effective at eliminating the Iraqi threat; and 2. Woefully prepared to handle the post-conflict element of operations in Iraq. Recent publications from George Packer's "Assassin's Gate" and Bob Woodward's "State of Denial" suggest that much of this has been caused by the administration's unwillingness to face the realities caused by America's actions.

If true, this attitude would clearly be a major contributing factor to the problem. It, alone, is not sufficient, however. Planning an attack, or a campaign, against a target or a country is a complex undertaking. It requires an understanding of the force being faced, it's strengths and weaknesses, the terrain, and myriad other items. But it is fairly transferrable from one place to another: tanks are always tanks; guns are always guns. Achieving victory, then, is something that takes a great deal of effort--but is something that our military is eminently well suited to do.

Achieving peace, prosperity, and ultimately political success, is something our military has not trained for, and is not presently equipped to do. Unfortunately, neither are any of our other federal departments or agencies. Creating a stable, productive, and peaceful country where there was a despotic autocracy requires a very differents set of skills and knowledge--and a country (or even provincial-level) expertise that our soldiers do not have the luxury to afford. On V-E and V-J day in world war two, the U.S. Generals in charge had spent the entirety of those wars facing the adversaries. They had at their disposal staffs with extensive knowledge of the countries and cultures in play--not just the relevant military information, but extensive information about history, culture, society, and in-country networks that existed or were believed to exist. And they had several years of working with these people to develop a clear sense of what would be needed not only to win the war, but, to use a cliche, "to win the peace."

Since World War II, our military has in both real and relative terms become a force unrivaled. Our experience in Vietnam gave us the "Powell Doctrine" of using "overwhelming force" to defeat an enemy. These two together, have left the U.S. in a position where our political leadership, and our military commanders no longer have the time to gain sufficient knowledge about a place, or establish networks of people who have this information, to create and put in place (much less execute) a plan that will allow the U.S. to succeed after the military operation has been successful.

This is not just a problem, it is a crisis. Unless we can bring our ability to win peace in line with our ability to fight wars, the United States will have more situations like Iraq in our future, not less. We will identify threats to our safety. We will neutralize them. And, perversely, we will be less secure after the threat is gone then we were when the threat was there.